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H
ealth care expenditures in the United States
are expanding rapidly. Real per capita expen-
ditures on health care more than doubled over the
period 1970–90.1 Real expenditures for health
care are now growing nearly 4 percent per year,
while real expenditures on other consumer goods
are growing only 2.5 percent per year.2 Further-
more, health services grew more than twice as fast
as any other major industry during the recent
recession. If expenditures continue to grow at the
current rate, health care will represent a larger
share of the United States’ gross domestic product
(GDP) than manufacturing by 2000.3
The explosive growth in health care expen-
ditures concerns many Americans. Citizens fear
that they will be priced out of the market for health
care. Business people worry that rising health care
costs will reduce the international competitiveness
of U.S. corporations. Politicians worry that rising
bills for health care programs like Medicare and
Medicaid will force the government to raise taxes
or run increasingly large deficits.
The widespread concern has led to demands
for substantial reform of the U.S. health care
system. Some groups call for controls on health
care prices. Others want to reform the insurance
industry. There are plans that call for managed
competition and plans that eliminate competition
by making the government the sole provider of
health services. There are almost as many plans as
there are interested parties.
However, before we can fix the system, we
have to know what parts of it are broken. If the
increase in health expenditures reflects distortions
in demand, then we should focus on reforming
consumer incentives. If distortions in supply fuel the
expenditures increase, then we should respond
with policies that affect suppliers. If the increase
in health expenditures reflects shifts in market
fundamentals—for example, the increasing health
care demands of an aging population—then
economic analysis suggests that the system does
not need fixing, and we should leave it alone.
Why is everyone so concerned?
Until recently, health care costs were not a
major concern of most Americans. Surveys on the
top problems facing the United States in 1984 did
not even mention health care.4 Today, however,
reforming the health care system is one of the
primary objectives of state and federal governments.
A look at health care prices suggests one
reason for this change in perspective. As Figure 1
America’s Health Care Problem:
An Economic Perspective
Our thanks to Zsolt Becsi, Steve Brown, and Mark  Wynne
for their comments and suggestions.
1 Levit et al. (1991).
2 Based on data from the U.S. Department of Commerce,
Bureau of Economic Analysis.
3 Based on data from the U.S. Department of Commerce,
Bureau of Economic Analysis.
4 For example, see the reader survey in Tift (1984).Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 22
indicates, health care prices increased at roughly
the same rate as the general price level until the
early 1980s. After the mid-1980s, however, the
medical care component of the consumer price
index shot upward. By 1992, medical care prices
were increasing at more than twice the rate of
inflation.5
This sharp increase in health care prices has
led consumers to fear that they are being priced
out of the market for health care. Publicity on the
35 million uninsured Americans lends credibility
to those fears.6 Because many Americans view
health care as essential, the prospect of being
unable to afford it frightens them.
Rising health care prices also concern busi-
ness because employers pay a large proportion of
the Medicare and Medicaid taxes and 64 percent
of private insurance premiums.7 Wage and price
controls during World War II encouraged employers
to provide fringe benefits such as health insurance
in lieu of wage increases. The tax-exempt status
of fringe benefits led many employers to continue
the practice after the controls were removed.
Therefore, much of the increase in health care
expenditures is a drag on the balance sheets of
American employers.
Furthermore, government is concerned about
increasing health care costs. Federal expenditures
for Medicare, which finances health care services
for the elderly, and Medicaid, which finances
health care services for the poor and disabled,
have been growing more than 10 percent per year
since 1985.8 The Congressional Budget Office
estimates that health spending consumed 15 percent
of the federal budget in 1992 and will consume
28 percent of the federal budget by 2002.9
Ultimately, however, consumers bear the
burden of increases in health care spending. Much
of the increase in employer health costs is passed
along to employees in the form of lower wages
(see the box entitled “Health Care Costs and
Profitability”). The increase in government health
costs is passed along to citizens in the form of
higher taxes or fewer alternative services. There-
fore, consumers would be the primary beneficiaries
of health care reform.
Sources of increasing health
care expenditures
It is possible to determine the best way to
reform the health care system using the basic
principles of supply and demand. If no distortions
exist, the health care market achieves the optimal
resource allocation for a given income distribution.
The increase in health care expenditures then
reflects either an increase in the public’s desire for
health services or an increase in legitimate costs.
Under these conditions, if society is unhappy with
the allocation, the best solution is to redistribute
income without meddling in the health care market.
5 The medical care component of the consumer price index
may mismeasure medical inflation somewhat, because it is
difficult to adjust properly for changes in medical tech-
nology and the quality of care. However, it undoubtedly
influences the public’s perceptions of health care prices.
6 Garrison (1990).
7 Levit and Cowan (1991).
8 Levit et al. (1991).
9 Burman and Rodgers (1992).
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However, if the health care system is distorted,
reform is needed to eliminate the distortions.
We have identified several distortions in the
current system of health care. First, tax subsidies for
employer-provided health insurance lead to excess
demand for health insurance and, consequently,
to excess consumption of health care. Second,
regulations and industry practices restrict the supply
of health care professionals, leading to higher
prices for health services. Finally, the structure of
the health insurance industry promotes inefficiency.
These distortions of both supply and demand lead
to excessive expenditures on health care.
Expenditures also are increasing for several
reasons that are nondistortionary. These reasons
include uncertainty about causes and appropriate
treatments for health problems, changes in popula-
tion demographics, and society’s reluctance to
place limits on the value of human life.
The implicit tax subsidy for health insurance
For nearly fifty years, employer-provided
fringe benefits have been exempt from both
personal income taxes and payroll taxes such as
those for Social Security. Thus, employees avoid
taxes by taking some of their compensation in the
form of health insurance. If the combined marginal
tax rate is 28 percent, an employee can receive $1’s
worth of health care instead of 72 cents’ worth of
after-tax take-home pay (Table 1). The difference
represents an implied tax subsidy. As Table 1
Businesses pay most of the nation’s
health bills, but the effect of increasing health
care costs on profits is not straightforward.
Although increases in health costs for retirees
would have a negative effect on firm profitabil-
ity, increases in health costs for current em-
ployees can have a positive effect on firm
profitability.
The health care costs of current workers
are part of a total compensation offer that is
determined by the worker’s contribution to the
firm’s output. As long as the worker’s produc-
tivity is unaffected by increases in health care
costs, the amount of total compensation the
firm is willing to offer is unaffected by in-
creases in health costs. Therefore, increases
in health costs should be offset by decreases
in wages to keep the total compensation
package unchanged.
Furthermore, the increase in health care
costs increases the value to employees of the
tax exemption for fringe benefits. The advan-
tages of being employed by a firm that offers
health benefits increase, so more workers are
attracted to such firms. As the supply of labor
offered to firms that provide health benefits
Health Care Costs and Profitability
increases, the total price those firms must pay
for it decreases, and those firms’ total com-
pensation costs can fall. Therefore, firms that
offer health insurance as a fringe benefit to
their employees can be made better off—not
worse off—by the increase in health costs.
Unfortunately, the savings on total com-
pensation for current employees can be more
than offset by increased costs for the health
care of retirees. After all, the increases in
health costs for retirees cannot be offset by
decreases in wages. The problem has be-
come particularly evident recently as account-
ing rule changes have forced firms to indicate
their commitments to retiree benefits on their
balance sheets. For example, General Mo-
tors was forced to record a $22.2 billion charge
in 1992 for retiree and future retiree health
costs.1 Firms that respond to the increase in
health care costs by modifying or eliminating
health care coverage for the retired may face
increased wage demands by current employ-
ees who fear being treated in a similar way
when they retire.
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indicates, those in the highest tax bracket receive
the largest tax subsidy, while those in the lowest
tax bracket receive a much smaller subsidy.10
Because employees will naturally buy more
health insurance at 72 cents than at $1, excluding
health-related fringe benefits from taxable income
increases expenditures on health insurance by
those receiving the subsidy. Burman and Rodgers
(1992) estimate that the subsidy costs the federal
government $65 billion per year in foregone
revenue and increases private health insurance
spending by roughly one-third.
Excessive consumption of health insurance
has a number of disquieting consequences. First,
because health insurance leads to increased con-
sumption of health care, excessive consumption
of health insurance produces excessive consump-
tion of health care. (For a discussion of the ways
in which health insurance increases health care
consumption, see the box entitled “The Relation-
ship Between Health Insurance and Health Care
Consumption.”) Second, overconsumption of health
insurance by those receiving the implicit subsidy
increases the insurance premiums of the unsub-
sidized and may cause some consumers to be
underinsured. Finally, excessive health insurance
distorts medical research in favor of technologies
that extend or improve life at any price rather than
technologies that reduce the costs of treatment.
By its nature, health insurance makes con-
sumers less sensitive to health care prices, thereby
generating more expenditures on health care than
would otherwise occur. Given this relationship,
excessive insurance consumption necessarily leads
to excessive health care consumption. Phelps
(1992) estimates that annual health care expendi-
tures are between 10 percent and 20 percent
higher because of the subsidy.
By leading to excessive health care expendi-
tures, the tax subsidy also can exacerbate the
problem of the uninsured. Because the subsidy
increases demand for health care, health care prices
rise, putting upward pressure on health insurer
costs. Higher payouts result in higher insurance
premiums. Thus, the subsidy distorts the distribu-
tion of health insurance so that higher income
households overconsume health insurance, while
lower income households can be priced out of
the market for health insurance and health care.
Overconsumption of health insurance also
plays a role in directing technical progress in health
care and has reinforced the development of costly
technologies. Contrary to conventional wisdom,
technological improvements in health care generally
have not lowered costs. Rather, technological
innovations have brought about a higher quality
Table 1
The Subsidized Price of Health Care
Income Effective marginal Price of health care
tax tax rate* in terms of
Wage (percent) (percent) take-home pay
$1 0 14 $.86
$1 15 28 $.72
$1 28 40 $.60
$1 33 45 $.55
*Effective marginal tax rate equals share of the last dollar of monetary compensation paid in
federal taxes and includes both payroll and income taxes.
10 Residents of cities and states with income taxes receive
additional subsidies because their fringe benefits are also
exempt from local income taxes.Economic Review — Third Quarter 1993 25
product, which is most often more expensive than
the older product. Weisbrod (1991) finds that our
system of pricing (that is, paying the health care
provider based on costs incurred or on a fee-for-
service basis) has led the research and develop-
ment sector to develop new technologies that
enhance the quality of care irrespective of cost
rather than the cost-effective technologies that
probably would develop if consumers were more
sensitive to health care prices.
One could argue that the tax subsidy is
necessary because without it, poor people would
receive less medical care and there would be
greater public health risks from communicable
The Relationship Between Health Insurance and Health Care Consumption
Substantial research indicates that as
the price to consumers decreases, health
care consumption increases (Long and
Rodgers 1990, Phelps 1992, Keeler and Rolph
1988, Manning et al. 1987). According to the
Rand Health Insurance Experiment, the price
elasticity of demand for health care is –0.2
(Keeler and Rolph 1988, Manning et al. 1987).
In other words, every 1 percent decrease in
consumer prices for health care increases
health care consumption by 0.2 percent.
Insurance reduces the consumer’s ef-
fective price of health care in two ways. First,
because health insurers typically pay for health
treatments rather than for health losses, in-
surance lowers the marginal price of treat-
ment. If a consumer is fully insured (and,
therefore, pays none of the billable costs of
treatment), then the marginal cost of health
care becomes the opportunity cost of the
consumer’s time. If a consumer is co-insured,
then the marginal cost of treatment becomes
a predetermined fraction of the treatment
cost, plus the consumer’s opportunity costs.
For example, with a copayment of 20 percent,
a $10 prescription antihistamine costs the
consumer only $2. In either case, health in-
surance effectively reduces the consumer’s
marginal cost of health care.
Second, because health insurance pre-
miums are only loosely connected to claims,
insurance insulates people from some of the
costs of their decisions. Theoretically, insur-
ance premiums, which reflect expected losses,
are a function of health risk and the extent of
claims. In such a case, consumers have in-
centives to limit their health care consumption
and submit only those claims that are worth
the resulting increase in premiums. In prac-
tice, however, an individual in a large health
insurance plan pays an average premium that
is almost independent of the individual’s risk
or health care consumption. Hence, consum-
ers do not bear the full costs of their decisions
about the extent of claims.
Furthermore, the loose connection be-
tween premiums and claims in health insur-
ance exacerbates problems of moral hazard.
Moral hazard arises when insurance changes
the insured’s behavior in a way that increases
claims. For example, people who are insured
and who, therefore, know that they will bear
only part of the cost of illness, may not be as
careful of their health as people who are not
insured. Individuals will have no incentive to
curb unhealthy behavior if increased claims
are not reflected in higher premiums, espe-
cially if behavior cannot be easily monitored.
Thus, health insurance increases ex-
penditures on health care. In the Rand experi-
ment, fully insured individuals spent 30 percent
more on outpatient services than individuals
with a 25 percent copayment. In turn, individu-
als with a 25 percent copayment spent 28
percent more than individuals with a 95 per-
cent copayment (Manning et al. 1987).1
1 Both co-insurance programs had an annual cap on out-of-
pocket expenses.Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 26
diseases such as tuberculosis. However, the pro-
gressive nature of the income tax code negates
those arguments. As Figure 2 indicates, high-income
households receive a greater health insurance
subsidy than low-income households. Households
that fall in the lowest income tax bracket receive a
small subsidy because health benefits are exempt
from Social Security and other payroll taxes. Mean-
while, some of the households in the highest income
tax bracket receive a federal subsidy of nearly 50
percent when both income and payroll taxes are
considered. In combination with an exemption
from state taxes, high-income households in high-
tax states receive an even larger subsidy. There is
little risk that high-income households will not be
able to afford insurance and no obvious consen-
sus that these groups deserve public assistance.
Supply constraints
Numerous restrictions on entry to the health
care profession distort health care supply and lead
to higher consumer prices. These restrictions
include limits on access to medical training, licens-
ing and certification requirements for doctors, and
work rules that exclude paraprofessionals from
performing many medical tasks. The restrictions
are ostensibly designed to protect the consumer by
increasing the quality of the health care product.
Studies have shown, however, that regulations
that limit supply do not always lead to higher
quality and tend to increase expenditures because
they increase incomes in the profession.
People who want to become doctors must first
gain entry into an accredited U.S. medical school.
Doctors who train at nonaccredited schools or in
other countries frequently are not permitted to prac-
tice medicine in the United States. The market for
medical training is monopolistic, and the number of
medical school applicants greatly exceeds the number
of openings at accredited schools. Each year since
1960, medical school applications have exceeded
classroom openings by at least 50 percent (Associa-
tion of American Medical Colleges 1993, Table B–
1). In the 1992–93 school year, there were two
applicants for every opening. Restrictions on the
supply of medical training necessarily restricts the
supply of physicians. Assuming that those students
who were not accepted into medical schools were
only 50 percent as likely to complete their education
as those who were accepted, the restriction reduces
physician supply by approximately 30 percent.
Once physicians have graduated from
medical school, they face additional restrictions
imposed by state and local agencies. States have
licensing and regulatory agencies or boards that
regulate the medical profession. The agencies
establish the minimum level of education and
experience required to practice, define the functions
of the profession, and limit the performance of
certain functions to licensed professionals. Restric-
tions include the use of trade names, restrictions
on branch offices and location of offices, and, until
1977, a ban on advertising (Haas–Wilson 1992).
Many studies have shown that occupational
licensing leads to lower consumer welfare and
higher incomes in the licensed profession. Economic
theory suggests that self-licensing by the medical
profession leads to economic rents (Friedman
1962 and Stigler 1971). Leland (1979) finds that
although minimum quality standards may be
desirable in markets in which suppliers have more
information than consumers, the minimum quality
standards set by the medical industry may be too
high. Chan and Leland (1982) show that when both
price and quality are hard to observe, uninformed
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.
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consumers may pay a higher price and receive a
lower quality of goods. Haas–Wilson (1986) finds
that increasing the restrictiveness of optometrists’
licensing examinations increased the price of eye
exams and eyeglasses significantly but had an
insignificant effect on the quality of the eye exams.
Whenever entry into a market is artificially
constrained, either through restricted access to
medical training or through obstacles such as
licensing and certification, consumer prices are
inefficiently high. Therefore, restrictions on entry
into the health care profession, together with
work rules that prevent competition within the
profession between physicians and less-expensive
paraprofessionals, increase medical costs.
Relaxing some of the restrictions on entry
into the medical profession should make consumers
better off. Shaked and Sutton (1981) show that
granting monopolistic powers to the self-regulat-
ing profession is likely to be welfare-reducing and
that the entry of paraprofessionals would be
welfare-improving. Moreover, the size of the para-
profession that leads to the greatest improvement
in welfare is the size that leads to the greatest
income loss for members already in the profession.
Evans and Williamson (1978) estimate that in
Ontario, Canada, a dental care system that made
optimal use of paraprofessionals could reduce the
cost of care by 30 percent to 40 percent. More
recent studies on restrictions in the dental profes-
sion (Liang and Ogur 1987) estimate that state
restrictions on the number of auxiliaries a dentist
can hire and the functions they may perform cost
consumers $700 million in 1982.
Counter to the principles of supply and
demand, there are some who assert that an increase
in physician supply would, in fact, cause higher
prices. They cite the phenomenon that doctors
charge higher fees in communities with high
physician-to-patient ratios than they charge in
communities that are less well supplied, even
after adjusting for input cost differences.
However, there is no need to suspend the
laws of supply and demand to explain this phe-
nomenon. Where there is a greater density of
physicians, there also may be a greater degree of
specialization and nonprice competition. Physicians
segment a large market and respond to a greater
variety of needs and preferences by treating fewer
patients but charging higher prices.11
Inefficiencies in the insurance
industry’s structure
Another distortion in the health care system
arises from the structure of the insurance industry.
The market for health insurance is dominated by
noncompetitive firms. Medicare and Medicaid,
which represent 57 percent of the insurance market,
are government entities.12 Furthermore, much of
the private market for health insurance is domi-
nated by not-for-profit groups like Blue Cross and
Blue Shield. Only 30 percent of the health insur-
ance market is served by for-profit commercial
insurers. Without the discipline of competition,
the market for health insurance is inefficient and
encourages higher health care costs.
Considerable economic research indicates
that government agencies are, in general, ineffi-
cient (Breton 1974, Downs 1967, and Tullock
1965 and 1967). According to Niskanen (1971), gov-
ernment agencies are more likely to try to maxi-
mize the size of their budgets than to maximize
profits because budget size is a mark of the power
and prestige of the agency. Among other bureau-
cratic goals are salaries, office perks, and patronage.
Weatherby (1971) cites the expansion of personnel
as a goal pursued by bureaucrats. Borcherding’s
(1977) and Spann’s (1977) findings on the growth
of government and lack of productivity growth
are consistent with Niskanen’s theory. Since agencies
have to return any unused moneys to the U.S.
Treasury, they are not residual claimants on cost
savings in the budget and have few incentives to
cut costs. There is no reason to believe that
Medicare and Medicaid administrators behave
differently than other bureaucrats.
Like government agencies, not-for-profit
firms also face incentives to behave inefficiently.
(Alchian and Demsetz 1972, Eisenstadt and Ken-
nedy 1981, and Sindelar 1988). Nonprofit health
insurers have incentives to dissipate any potential
profits through excess payments to doctors and
11 Phelps (1992, 202).
12 U.S. Bureau of the Census (1992).Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 28
hospitals, unusually generous insurance coverage,
or artificially low insurance premiums. Sindelar
(1988) finds that, unlike for-profit insurers, Blue
Cross and Blue Shield plans (the Blues) do not
respond to market forces by changing the price of
health insurance (measured as the ratio of pre-
miums to benefits). In particular, Sindelar finds
that administrative costs for the Blues increase as
the size of the typical insurance claim increases,
suggesting that the Blues do not take advantage
of economies of scale that are exploited by com-
mercial insurers.
In most industries, the existence of a com-
petitive fringe of efficient firms would discipline
the inefficient nonprofit firms (Baumol, Panzar and
Willig 1988; Caves and Christensen 1980). How-
ever, in the insurance industry, inefficient non-
profit insurers receive tax advantages not available
to for-profit insurers. Most states tax the insurance
premiums of for-profit insurers, while they exempt
the premiums of nonprofit insurers or tax them at
lower rates. Eisenstadt and Kennedy (1981) find
that Blue Shield plans were less efficient in states
where the plans had a tax advantage than in
states where they did not.13 According to Eisen-
stadt and Kennedy, “the regulatory advantages
given to the ‘blues’...allow inefficient behavior to
be maintained.” 14
One could argue that nonprofit insurers
should receive tax advantages because they gener-
ally accept customers with preexisting conditions
that other insurers consider uninsurable. However,
society could subsidize insurance for individuals
with preexisting conditions without requiring that
the insurer be a nonprofit organization. For ex-
ample, the government could provide Medicare
and Medicaid recipients with the resources to
purchase private insurance rather than providing
the insurance itself. There is no need to finance
an inefficient market structure.
Nondistortionary sources
of increasing expenditures
In addition to the distortions, a number of
nondistortionary factors lead to higher health care
expenditures. Uncertainties on the part of both
physicians and consumers as to the nature and
causes of health problems lead to more health
care consumption than would occur if all informa-
tion were freely available. However, information
is not free, and some of these expenditures are the
natural result of optimization under uncertainty.
Other nondistortionary factors that contribute to
higher expenditures include changes in the demo-
graphic composition of the U.S. population and
the nearly infinite value placed on human lives.
Uncertainty has a major influence on medical
decision-making. Doctors and patients have in-
complete information about causes and cures for
many health problems. Phelps (1992) shows that
there is substantial disagreement and uncertainty
within the medical profession about the marginal
productivity of alternative medical treatments.
Uncertainty about the optimal course of action for
various health problems, together with consumers’
distaste for taking risks with their health, leads to
increased testing and treatments and, therefore,
higher health expenditures.
Further, because patients lack the informa-
tion to reliably judge medical care quality, they
must rely on their doctor’s advice and judgment.
But much like an auto mechanic, the doctor has
incentives to provide (and bill for) more services
than absolutely necessary and to provide those
services with less than maximum effort. Economists
refer to these situations as principal–agent prob-
lems. The usual solution to such problems is a
contract that provides the agent (in this case the
health professional) with incentives to behave
optimally and a mechanism for monitoring the
agent’s compliance with that contract. The mecha-
nism to monitor doctors’ behavior and provide
incentives for optimal performance is the mal-
practice suit.
Unfortunately, asymmetric damages make
malpractice suits more effective at inducing careful
care than cost-effective care. After all, if the doctor
orders too few tests and a patient is injured or
killed, the potential damage is huge. However, if
the doctor orders too many tests, the damage is
13 Inefficiency is measured by the ratio of administrative costs
to premiums. Both administrative costs and premiums are
expressed as net of premium taxes, if any.
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limited to the cost of the tests. Whenever there is
uncertainty about the appropriate number of tests,
the risk-averse doctor will prescribe more tests. Thus,
malpractice laws and asymmetric damages create
incentives for defensive medicine—procedures
designed to ward off lawsuits rather than diseases.
According to the American Medical Association,
defensive medicine and malpractice insurance add
$36 billion to the nation’s medical bills each year.15
In addition to uncertainty, the changing
demographics of the U.S. population also contrib-
ute to increases in health care expenditures. Per
capita health care expenditures increase with both
age and income. For example, consumers 65 and
over consume more than three-and-one-half times
as much health care as consumers ages 19 to 64
(Figure 3). The aging of the population is expected
to explain one-seventh of the increase in health
care expenditures over the 40 years from 1990 to
2030.16 Furthermore, real U.S. income per capita
has grown 2.2 percent per year over the past three
decades, and as populations grow wealthier, they
consume more of all normal goods, including
health care. Simple regression analysis suggests
that one-quarter of the increase in per capita health
expenditures over the period 1960–90 can be
explained by these two demographic factors.
Finally, the high value we place on human
life leads to higher expenditures in the health
care system. Because most consumers would be
willing to spend huge amounts to avoid dying,
insured consumers will demand any treatment,
however costly, that will prolong a patient’s life.
The Council of Economic Advisers (1993) esti-
mates that the 5 percent of beneficiaries who are
in the last year of their lives consume 29 percent
of the Medicare budget.
Summary and conclusions
Health care expenditures in the United States
have expanded rapidly in the past twenty years.
This growth in expenditures concerns business
people, politicians, and individual consumers of
health care, although most of the burden falls on
the consumer. Hence, health care reform has
become a primary objective of policymakers.
Increasing expenditures for health care are
not a problem when they reflect consumer demands
for health care in an undistorted market, and
some of the recent increases clearly represent the
demands of an aging and increasingly wealthy
population. However, we have identified a number
of distortions in the health care market that have
a substantial impact on health care expenditures.
The personal income tax code subsidizes health
insurance consumption, thereby fostering exces-
sive consumption of health care. Tax exemptions
for nonprofit insurers and restrictions on the
supply of health services also lead to higher costs.
To be effective, health care reform must
address these distortions in the health care system.
Eliminating the tax subsidy for employer-provided
health insurance, reducing the tax advantages of
nonprofit insurers, and reducing the restriction
on health care providers would go a long way
toward eliminating America’s health care problem.
Only after these distortions are removed can the
economy achieve an efficient allocation of health
resources.
Figure 3
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